A large body of empirical research has shown that prices of identical goods sold sequentially sometimes increase and often decline across rounds. This paper introduces a tractable form of risk aversion, called aversion to price risk, and shows that declining prices arise naturally when bidders are averse to price risk. When there are informational externalities, there is a countervailing e¤ect which pushes prices to raise along the path of a sequential auction, even if bidder's signals are independent. The paper shows how to decompose the e¤ect of aversion to price risk from the e¤ect of informational externalities.
Introduction
Sequential auctions are a common way of selling multiple lots of the same or similar goods. How should we expect prices to vary from one round to the next when there is no signi…cant delay between rounds?
A plausible answer is that we should expect the law of one price to hold; controlling for any di¤erence between the lots, on average prices ought to be the same in di¤erent rounds. If they were not, if prices in round 2 were lower than in round 1, then we should expect, roughly speaking, demand to shift from round 1 to round 2 until prices are equalized.
This simple answer turns out to have solid game theoretical foundations. As …rst shown by Weber (1983) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) , in the basic model with symmetric, risk-neutral, unit-demand bidders having independent private values, the price sequence of any standard auction is a martingale (the expected value of P k+1 , the price in round k + 1, conditional on P k , the price in round k, is equal to P k ).
The validity of the answer, however, does not seem to be supported by the data. A large body of empirical research has shown, in di¤erent settings, that prices sometimes increase and often decline across rounds. Sequential auctions where prices have been shown to decline include wine (Ashenfelter, 1989, McAfee and Vincent, 1993), ‡owers (van den Berg et al., 2001 ), livestock (Buccola, 1982) , gold jewellery (Chanel et al., 1996) , china from shipwrecks (Ginsburgh and van Ours, 2007) , stamps (Thiel and Petry, 1995) , Picasso prints (Pesando and Shum, 1996) , art (Beggs and Graddy, 1997) , condominiums (Ashenfelter and Genesove, 1992) , commercial real estate (Lusht, 1994) . There is also experimental evidence of declining prices (Burns, 1985 , and Keser and Olson, 1996) . Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003) contains a general survey that focuses on art auctions. While declining prices are more frequent, increasing prices have also been documented. For example, they were found for library books by Deltas and Kosmopolou (2001) , watches by Chanel et al. (1996) , wool by Jones et al. (2004) , and Israeli cable tv by Gandal (1997) .
An extension of the basic model generates increasing prices. Maintaining all the other assumptions, Milgrom and Weber (1982) showed that if the bidders'signals are a¢ liated rather than statistically independent and there are informational externalities, then the price sequence is a submartingale (the expected value of P k+1 conditional on P k is higher than P k ). There are informational externalities (or interdependent types), if a bidder's payo¤ from winning an object directly depends on the signals (or types) of the other bidders. One di¢ culty of the model with a¢ liated signals, however, is that it is not very tractable. Milgrom and Weber (1982) was circulated as a working paper for a long time and only published in 2000.
In a foreword and bracketed comments in their published version, Milgrom and Weber motivated the publishing delay to the proofs of many of their results having "refused to come together" (p.179) and added that some of the results "should be regarded as being in doubt" (p.188). Ashenfelter (1989) informally proposed risk aversion as a possible explanation of declining prices. The most commonly used model of risk averse bidders (e.g., Matthews, 1983, and McAfee and Vincent, 1993) assume that a bidder has a monetary value for the object, so that risk aversion is de…ned on the di¤erence between the monetary value of the object and its price. McAfee and Vincent (1993) demonstrated that this model of risk averse bidders does not yield a convincing explanation of declining prices. They studied tworound, private-value, …rst-price and second-price auctions, and showed that prices decline only if bidders display increasing absolute risk aversion, which seems implausible. Under the more plausible assumption of decreasing absolute risk-aversion, an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist and average prices need not decline. Because of this di¢ culty to explain declining prices with a simple generalization of the basic model, they have become a sort of a puzzle, referred in the literature as the afternoon e¤ ect (because after a morning auction, often the second round takes place in the afternoon), or the declining price anomaly.
The …rst contribution of this paper is to introduce a special case of risk aversion, called aversion to price risk, and to show that without informational externalities a pure strategy equilibrium exists and prices decline, when bidders are averse to price risk. An important advantage of the notion of aversion to price risk is that it yields a model that is as tractable as the model with risk neutral bidders. Indeed, the proofs deriving the equilibrium bidding functions are straightforward modi…cations of the standard proofs in the risk neutral case. In contrast, as we already mentioned, the commonly used model of risk averse bidders is not very tractable.
Aversion to price risk is a useful conceptual innovation. It is a special case of the general model of risk averse bidders studied by Maskin and Riley (1984) . Contrary to the model analysed by McAfee and Vincent (1993) , it assumes separability of a bidder's payo¤ between utility from winning an object and utility from the bidder's monetary wealth (or disutility from paying the price). A bidder that is averse to price risk prefers to win an object at a certain price, rather than at a random price with the same expected value. Budget constraints with costly …nancing are a natural way in which aversion to price risk arises.
Suppose a bidder values an object $21, only has a budget of $10 and must pay an interest rate of 10% on any amount borrowed to …nance a price above $10: Such a bidder strictly prefers a certain price of $10 which gives him a payo¤ of $11, to a random price of $20 or $0 with equal probability. Because it costs an additional $1 to …nance a purchase at a price of $20, the random price gives the bidder an expected payo¤ of $10:5: As we shall see, a budget constraint is not the only possible explanation for aversion to price risk.
It is easiest to explain the intuition for why aversion to price risk generates declining prices in the case of a two-round, second-price auction with private values and unit-demand bidders. The price in the last round will be determined by the second highest bid. The crucial observation is that in the …rst round each bidder chooses his optimal bid assuming that he will win and will be the price setter; that is, he assumes that his bid is tied with the highest bid of his opponents. This is because a small change in his bid only matters when the bidder wins and is the price setter. The fundamental implication of this observation is that in choosing his optimal bid, a bidder views the …rst-round price as certain (equal to his bid) and the second-round price as a random variable (equal to the second highest, second-round bid). Optimality requires that the bidder be indi¤erent between winning in the …rst or in the second round. Aversion to price risk then implies that the expected second-round price (conditional on the …rst-round price) must be lower than the …rst-round price. The di¤erence is the risk premium that the bidder must receive to be indi¤erent between winning at a random, rather than a certain, price. The result that aversion to price risk generates a tendency for prices to decline, called an aversion to price risk e¤ ect, and its intuition, is general. It holds for auctions with more than two rounds, for second-price, …rst-price, and English auctions.
It also holds if there are informational externalities (i.e., if values are not purely private).
An advantage of assuming statistically independent, rather than a¢ liated, bidders'signals is that the model remains very tractable when adding informational externalities. Another contribution of this paper is to show that a¢ liated signals are not needed to explain increasing prices. Informational externalities alone, even with independent signals, push prices to increase across rounds. 1 The intuition for this result is the following. In any but the last round of a sequential auction, it is optimal for a bidder to bid so as to be indi¤erent between barely winning (being tied with an opponent) and winning in the next round.
For a risk-neutral bidder, this amounts to bidding the expected price in the next round conditional on barely winning. On the other hand, the winner never barely wins. Thus, with information externalities the winning price in the current round conveys, on average, good news to bidders and raises the next round price. More precisely, the expected price in round k + 1 conditional on the realized price in round k is higher than the expected price in round k + 1 conditional on barely winning in round k.
The paper also studies the case with both informational externalities and aversion to price risk, and shows how to separate the aversion to price risk e¤ect, which reduces prices from one round to the next, from the informational e¤ect, which increases prices from round to round. The combined presence of the two e¤ects may help explaining the more complex price paths, with prices increasing between some rounds and decreasing between others, that we sometimes observe in the data (e.g., see Jones et al., 2004 ).
Most of the paper studies the …rst-price and second-price sequential auctions with unit-demand bidders, but Section 8 shows that the results extend to English auctions.
Before proceeding, I should add that there are other models in the literature that generate declining prices. They include winners having the option to buy additional units (Black and de Meza, 1992) , heterogeneity of objects (Bernhardt and Scoones, 1994 , Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1994 , Gale and Hausch, 1994 , ordering of the objects for sale by declining value (Beggs and Graddy, 1997), absentee bidders (Ginsburgh, 1998) , an unknown number of objects for sale (Jeitschko, 1999) , asymmetry among bidders 1 Stochastic scale e¤ects (Jeitschko and Wolfstetter, 1998 ) and uncertainty about the number of rounds (Feng and Chatterjee, 2005 ) may also generate increasing prices. (Gale and Stegeman, 2001 ), etc. I view aversion to price risk as complementary to the other explanations given in the literature. The explanation based on aversion to price risk has the advantage of applying very generally, without requiring any additional modi…cation of the basic auction model. This is an important advantage because, as the empirical evidence suggests, declining prices have been found to prevail even with no buyers'option to buy additional objects, with identical objects, etc.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents the equilibria of the …rst-price and second-price auction. Section 4 presents the afternoon e¤ect when there are no informational externalities. Section 5 looks at risk neutral bidders with informational externalities. Section 6 studies the general model with aversion to price risk and informational externalities. It de…nes and discusses the aversion to price risk e¤ect and the informational e¤ect. Section 7 presents a calibrated example that shows how the data from empirical studies can be reproduced for plausible values of an aversion to price risk and an informational externality parameter. Section 8 discusses extensions of the model and the robustness of the main results. Section 9 concludes. Most of the proofs and additional technical results are in the appendices.
The Model
There are K identical objects to be auctioned and N symmetric bidders, N > K. Each bidder has unit demand. Bidder i observes the realization x i of a signal X i , a random variable with support [x; x]: I assume that the signals are i.i.d. random variables with density f and distribution F . Let the vector x = (x 1 ; :::; x N ) 2 [x; x] N be the pro…le of signals of all bidders, and x i the vector of signals of all bidders except i. If i wins an object, the price he pays at auction, P , is, from bidder i's point of view, a random variable which depends on the bids of all bidders. If a bidder does not win an object, he pays nothing. Let p be a price realization. Bidder i's payo¤ when winning the object is
The function V (x i ; x i ) is the payo¤ or value from obtaining one object. Informational externalities are allowed and V may depend on the signals of all bidders. When the utility of bidder i only depends on x i there are no information externalities, or values are private. I make some standard assumptions:
is positive, twice di¤erentiable, the same for all bidders i, symmetric in x j , j 6 = i, and increasing in all its arguments with @V (x i ; x i )=@x i @V (x i ; x i )=@x j 0: The latter assumption (which is commonly made when there are interdependent valuations, e.g., see Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000) guarantees the allocational e¢ ciency of the equilibrium.
The function`(p) is the bidder's cost, or loss, when paying price p. I will assume that`is a convex function. When`is linear, bidder i is risk neutral and the model reduces to the standard model (with informational externalities); when`is strictly convex, the bidder is averse to price risk. I normalize`by assuming`(0) = 0:
A …rst interpretation of bidders that are averse to price risk is that they do not have an equivalent monetary value for the good on sale, but the good's quality V (x) contributes additively to the utility of money. A second interpretation is that V (x) is the monetary value of the object, but bidders are …nancially constrained and must borrow to …nance the purchase (e.g., see Che and Gale, 1998 ). In such a case`(p) is the cost the winner incurs when the price is p. An example is`(p) = p (1 + r (p)), where the interest rate r must satisfy the condition 2r 0 (p) + pr 00 (p) 0 to ensure convexity of`: 2
There are two main advantages of my formulation of the utility function u. The …rst is that it lends itself to a clean and novel interpretation of the behaviour of risk averse bidders. For example, consider a static, single-item, auction. A simple intuition for why bidders that are averse to price risk bid higher in a …rst-price than in a second-price auction is that a …rst-price auction insures them against any price risk; price when winning is certain in a …rst-price and random in a second-price auction. The standard explanation of revenue ranking with risk averse bidders is less transparent, having to appeal to the risk of losing the object. 3 As we shall see, the intuition for the results concerning sequential auctions is similarly It is worth pointing out that (1) is a special case of the utility function used in the general, single-item, auction design model with risk averse bidders of Maskin and Riley (1984) . They postulate that bidder i's utility when he wins an object and pays p can be written as u(x; p), and as an example of the general model mention the case in which u(x; p) = U (V (x) `(p)). Most of the literature on auctions with risk averse bidders, however, has focused on the subcase with V (x) = x i and`(p) = p.
Sequential Auctions: Equilibrium
In this section, I present the equilibrium bidding strategies of the sequential …rst-price and second-price auctions, in which one object is sold in each of K successive rounds to the highest bidder, at a price equal 2 While I will assume, for simplicity, that`is di¤erentiable everywhere, note that when the winning bidder pays a …xed interest r for any amount above his budget M; then the loss function is convex:`(p) = p + r max f0; p M g. 3 A potentially interesting idea, that I will not pursue here, is that aversion to price risk on the part of some bidders may help to explain the use of "buy-it-now" options in online auctions.
to the highest and second highest bid respectively. Recall that because of unit demand winners drop out of the auction. In round k K, the bidding function of each of the N (k 1) remaining bidders depends not only on his type, but also on the common history of announced prices and bids from previous rounds.
I will assume that at the end of each round only the bid of the winner is announced and I will look for symmetric equilibria in which the bid of a player is an increasing function of his type in each round k. Thus, in both auctions, revealing the winning bid is equivalent to revealing the signal of the winning bidder.
The bidding functions of the sequential …rst-price and second-price auctions were …rst derived by Weber (1983) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) for the case of risk neutral bidders. 4 The next two propositions extend Milgrom and Weber's results to the case of aversion to price risk. The proofs are straightforward extensions of the risk-neutral case and are relegated to Appendix A.
Let the random variable Y (n) j , an order statistic, be the j-th highest type of bidder out of n. The expected value of the object as a function of i's type x and the k highest types of bidder i's opponents, k = 0; :::; N 1 will be written as:
To understand the bidding functions in each round of a sequential …rst-price auctions with K objects we need to make a few observations. First, recall that in a standard, single-item, …rst-price auction with risk neutral bidders and private values, the bid of player i is equal to the expectation, conditional on winning, of the item's value to his closest competitor, the competitor with the highest signal. Second, with informational externalities the expected value of i's closest competitor j must be computed as if i's signal were equal to j's signal. Third, in an auction with K objects, bidder i's closest competitor is the bidder with the K-th highest signal among his opponents; this bidder would be the marginal winner if i were not around. Fourth, from the point of view of bidder i, the type of the closest competitor is the random
. Thus, in round k the expected value to i's closest competitor, conditional on the closest competitor assuming he has the same type as i and on the types of past winners is
Fifth, type x of bidder i conditioning on winning in round k amounts to conditioning on Y
: Finally, when bidders are averse to price risk it is useful to think of L =` S1 k (x; :::) as the bid loss associated with the bid S1 k (x; :::): De…ning =` 1 as the inverse of the loss function`, (L) is the bid that generates a bid loss L to the bidder. The function is strictly increasing and concave.
Proposition 1 In each round k of a sequential …rst-price auction, the bid loss of bidder i with signal x is equal to the expected value of the item to his closest competitor conditional on (i) the closest competitor assuming that he has the same signal as bidder i, (ii) the history of the winning types prior to round k, and (iii) bidder i winning in round k: S1 k (x; y k 1 ; :::; To understand the bidding functions in a sequential second-price auction, say that bidder i is pivotal in round k if he has the same signal as the k-th highest of his opponents, and hence he is in a tie with one opponent as the remaining bidder with the highest signal. The di¤erence between the bids in a …rst-price and a second-price auction is that in a second-price auction a bidder assumes that he is pivotal, rather than assuming he is just the winner. Thus, for example, in a single-item, second-price auction with private values and risk neutral bidders, bidder i's bid is equal to his expected value for the object or, equivalently, the expected value of the object to his closest opponent, conditional on being pivotal.
Proposition 2
In each round k of a sequential second-price auction, the bid loss of bidder i with signal x is equal to the expected value of the item to his closest competitor conditional on (i) the closest competitor assuming that he has the same signal as bidder i, (ii) the history of the winning types prior to round k, and (iii) bidder i being pivotal in round k:
Note that with a single object, K = 1, private values and risk neutrality, the formulas in Propositions 1 and 2 reduce to the well known bid functions
I conclude this section with a remark. In a …rst-price auction, announcing the bid of the winner, as I have assumed, is equivalent to announcing the selling price, the standard practice in real auctions. This is not so in a second-price auction, where announcing the winning price amounts to revealing the type of the highest loser, a bidder who will be present in the next round. I will study the case of announcing the winning price in a sequential second-price auction in Section 8.
The Afternoon E¤ect
In this section, I assume that there are no informational externalities. With private values, i's payo¤ when winning the object is V (x i ); to simplify notation, I will renormalize the type space and write V (
The next proposition shows that declining prices are a natural consequence of aversion to price risk.
Proposition 3
When there are no informational externalities, the price sequences in a sequential …rst-price and in a sequential second-price auction are a supermartingale: The expected price in round k + 1 conditional on the price in round k is lower than the price in round k.
Proof. If there are no informational externalities, then announcing either the winning bids or prices has no direct e¤ect on the bidding functions. Consider …rst a sequential …rst-price auction. Given private
Suppose type x of bidder i wins auction k < K. Then it must be
It follows that
where the inequality follows from Jensen's inequality, given that is a strictly concave function. This shows that the price sequence in a sequential …rst-price auction is a supermartingale.
Consider now a sequential second-price auction. Given private values, it is
Suppose in round k the winner is the bidder with signal Y (N 1) k
; and bidder i of type x is the price setter;
that is,
. In round k + 1, bidder i of type x wins the auction, and the price setter is the bidder with the signal Y (N 1) k+1
. It follows that
Thus, the price sequence in a sequential second-price auction is also a supermartingale.
The intuition for the afternoon e¤ect is essentially the same in a …rst-price and a second-price sequential auction. In each round before the last, conditional on having the highest remaining type and being the price setter, a bidder must be indi¤erent between winning now and winning in the next round. 5 But if a bidder is the price setter, then he knows the current price, while next round's price is random. Because of aversion to price risk, next round's expected price must then be lower than the price now. The di¤erence is the risk premium the bidder must receive to be indi¤erent between the certain price now and the random price in the next round.
To understand this intuition in more detail, consider round k < K of the second-price auction. Suppose type x of bidder i has lost all preceding auctions. Suppose also that in round k bidder x considers raising his bid by a small amount " above S2 k (x). This will only make a di¤erence if, after the deviation, he wins in round k, while he would have otherwise lost and won in round k + 1. For this to happen, it must be that Y (N 1) k ' x; that is, we must be in the event in which bidder i with signal x is at the margin between winning and losing in round k (i.e., he must be pivotal, his signal must be tied with the signal of another bidder). Conditional on this event, the marginal cost of the deviation is the loss incurred in period k when bidding according to the deviation,`(
while the marginal bene…t is the expected loss avoided in period k + 1;
5 In a sequential …rst-price auction, if a bidder has the highest signal in round k and he bids according to the equilbrium bidding function, then he is automatically the price setter. In a sequential second-price auction, conditioning on the highestsignal bidder also being the price setter amounts to requiring that his signal is tied with the signal of another bidder (i.e., the bidder is pivotal).
Equating marginal cost and marginal bene…t (and sending " to zero) gives the following indi¤ erence condition (see equation (23) in Appendix A):
The indi¤erence condition says that the certain loss when winning in period k at a price S2 k (x) must be equal to the expected loss when winning in period k + 1. Since bidders are averse to price risk, it must then be the case that the expected price in round k + 1 is less than the price S2 k (x) in round k: For the marginal bidder to be indi¤erent between winning at a certain price now, or at an uncertain price in the next round, it must be the case that the next round's expected price (conditional on the current price) is lower than the current price. Hence prices must decline from one period to the next. Now consider a sequential …rst-price auction. Suppose bidder i wins in round k if he bids as a type
: Bidder i can also always bid so low so as to lose in round k.
With a losing bid, bidder i discovers the value of Y (N 1) k (the signal of the winner when bidder i bids low).
Bidder i can then win for sure in round k + 1 by bidding ). The indi¤erence condition for sequential …rst-price auctions states that bidder i must be indi¤erent between winning in round k and in round k + 1 (see equation (15) in Appendix A):
The left hand side is the certain loss associated with the period k price; the right hand side is the expected loss associated with the random price in period k + 1. Thus the price sequence must also be decreasing in a sequential …rst-price auction.
Another way to understand Proposition 3 is the following. We know from Weber (1983) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) that if bidders are risk neutral and values are private, then the price sequence is a martingale. When bidders are averse to price risk, the loss`(p) plays the same role for a bidder as the price p in the case of risk neutrality. Hence, the loss sequence associated with the price setting bids will be a martingale. Since`is a convex function, the price sequence must be a supermartingale; that is, price declines over time.
The E¤ect of Informational Externalities
In the literature on sequential auctions with unit demand, an increasing price sequence has only been derived in the model with a¢ liated signals by Milgrom and Weber (1982) . 6;7 In this section, I show that a¢ liated signals are not needed to generate increasing price sequences. With independent signals, risk neutral bidders (i.e.,`is the identity function) and informational externalities, prices increase along the equilibrium path of a sequential auction. The price sequence is a martingale only if there are no informational externality (i.e., in the common terminology, values are private).
Proposition 4
In a sequential …rst-price and in a sequential second-price auction with announcement of the winning bids, if bidders are risk neutral and there are informational externalities, then the price sequence is a submartingale: The expected price in round k + 1 conditional on the price in round k is higher than the price in round k.
Proof. Recall that`and coincide with the identity function. Consider …rst a sequential …rst-price auction. Suppose type x of bidder i wins auction k < K. It must be Y (N 1) k
x < y k 1 < ::: < y 1 , and
k (x; y k 1 ; :::;
k (x; y k 1 ; :::; y 1 ) where the inequality follows from S1 k+1 ( ) being a strictly increasing function of all its arguments and Y (N 1) k x. Thus, the price sequence in a sequential …rst-price auction is a submartingale. 6 However, as I pointed out in the introduction, in the published version of their working paper, Milgrom and Weber (1982, 2000) acknowledge that the proofs of their results with a¢ liated signals "should be regarded as being in doubt" (p. 188). . It follows that
k (x; y k 1 ; ::; y 1 )
Thus, the price sequence in a sequential second-price auction is also a submartingale.
To see why with informational externalities and risk neutral bidders prices tend to increase from one round to the next even in the case of independent signals, consider a sequential second-price auction (the reasoning for a …rst-price auction is similar). First, recall that in each round k, the price is equal to the bid of the loser with the highest signal. Second, observe that in each round k before the last, the price-setter, as any other bidder, chooses a bid that makes him indi¤erent between winning and winning in the next round, conditional on being pivotal in round k; that is, conditional on being tied with the winner as the remaining bidder with the highest signal. Thus, the price in round k is equal to the expected price in the next round conditional on the the price-setter in round k being pivotal. With informational externalities, this is lower than the next round expected price conditional on the current price. This is because with probability one the price-setter is not pivotal; that is, round k winner has a higher, not the same, signal than the price-setter, and the value of an object directly depends in a positive way on the signals of all bidders. Hence price tends to increase over time.
Aversion to Price Risk and Informational Externalities: E¤ect Decomposition
While aversion to price risk pushes prices to decline over time, informational externalities introduce a tendency for prices to increase. If bidders are both averse to price risk and there are informational externalities, it is possible to decompose the two countervailing e¤ects on the price sequence.
Recall that, given a bid loss L, we can think of (L) as the bid, or implicit price, that generates L: Let P Sj k be the price in round k of a …rst-price (for j = 1) or a second-price (for j = 2) auction. In de…ning the aversion to price risk e¤ect and the informational externality e¤ect, we always condition on the price in round k: This amount to conditioning on the types y k 1 ; :::; y 1 of the winners in the …rst k 1 rounds and on the type x of the price setter in round k:
We de…ne the aversion to price risk e¤ect as the di¤erence between the price expected in round k + 1 and the implicit price associated with the expected loss in round k + 1:
The aversion to price risk e¤ect is non-positive. It is immediate that in the case of risk neutrality A with strict inequality when there are informational externalities. 8 The next proposition, whose proof follows immediately from the de…nitions of A Sj k+1 and I Sj k+1 , shows that in both sequential auctions the expected price in round k + 1, conditional on the price in round k; is equal to the sum of the price in round k, the aversion to price risk e¤ect, and the informational externality e¤ect.
Proposition 5 Suppose the price setter in round k has signal x and the history of winners' signals up to round k 1 is y k 1 ; :::; y 1 : In the sequential …rst-price auction (j = 1) and the sequential second-price auction (j = 2) with announcement of the winning bids we have: 
A Calibrated Example
Can aversion to price risk explain the declining price sequences we observe in the data? What is the degree of aversion to price risk that is needed? May prices decline even with informational externalities?
This section provides some answers to these questions. I introduce a simple parametric example, and show that its predictions match the data from a sample of empirical studies, for reasonable speci…cations of the parameters. The empirical reference points for the discussion in this section are the papers of Ashenfelter (1989) Table 1 : Price ratio in the data I will make the following simplifying assumptions to the model. The quality valuation of an object to bidder i is 
We can interpret r = p`0 0 =`0 as a coe¢ cient of relative price-risk aversion. The inverse of`is I will restrict attention to the second-price auction and the case of two rounds, K = 2. In Appendix B, I
compute the bidding functions, the expected price in round 2 conditional on the …rst-round price P 1 ; and the ratio of the conditional expected second-round price to the …rst-round price.
In all computations reported in this section, I will set r = 2, a commonly used value for relative risk aversion in computational macroeconomics (e.g., see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000) ; it implies that a bidder is willing to pay a price about 1% higher to avoid a 50-50 gamble of a 10% increase or a 10% decrease in price. The results do not seem overly sensitive to the value of r.
Assume …rst that there are no informational externalities, that is b = 0. Figure 1 The average price ratio in the data in Table 1 Table 1 corresponds to values of the informational externality parameter between 0:0827 and 0:1260. Prices may decline even if there are informational externalities. In fact, the presence of both aversion to price risk and informational externalities could help explaining why in some auctions prices decline and in other they increase; it could also help explaining why in some multiple round auctions prices decline between some rounds and increase between other rounds (e.g., see Jones et al. 2004 ). 
Extensions
In this section, …rst I show that the aversion to price risk e¤ect is present even when the auction format is an oral ascending auction. Then I study sequential second-price auctions in which the winning price is announced.
The English Auction
Sequential auctions are often run using an English, or oral ascending, format. The most commonly used model to study a static, single unit, English auction is the so-called Japanese version, in which a price clock moves continuously and bidders can only decide when to quit. Once a bidder quits, he cannot re-enter.
When the second to last bidder quits, the clock stops and the last bidder standing wins at the current clock price. Using the Japanese format for sequential auctions is problematic. As Milgrom and Weber (1982) …rst pointed out, the equilibrium is the same as in the static English auction for multiple items. This is because the Japanese format forces all losing bidders to reveal their types during the …rst round and hence eliminates all uncertainty from future rounds.
Such a counterintuitive conclusion is a by-product of the extreme nature of the Japanese format. In practical ascending auctions, it is not the case that at the end of the …rst round all bidders in the room know the identity of all future winners and the types of all losing bidders. Bidders often stay silent at the beginning and only start bidding towards the end of a round. Some bidders stay silent throughout a round. To deal with these issues in a static, single-unit environment, Harstad and Rothkopf (2000) In the following proposition (the proof is in Appendix C), I will construct a monotone equilibrium in which in each round k the price E k below which a bidder is willing to enter and at which he will exit when active is an increasing function of his type x: In such an equilibrium, the …rst-round exit price reveals a bidder's type and a bidder rejects to be active if and only if a higher type has already exited.
Proposition 6
There is an equilibrium of the two-round, AR English auction, with no informational externalities, in which: (1) In the second round, bidder i of type x accepts to enter when the current clock price is below and exits when the clock price reaches
After M bidders have exited in the …rst round, max
o is the type of bidder i's closest competitor. Thus, in the AR English auction with private values, after M bidders have exited the …rst round, the bid loss of bidder i with signal x is equal to the expected value of the item to his closest competitor conditional on the highest type of the M bidders that have exited and on bidder i being pivotal. 9 9 Since active bidders have higher types than the bidders that have exited, when M N 2 ; it is Y
The winners of the auction are the two highest valuation bidders. There are two possible outcomes.
First, all bidders become active in the …rst round. In this case, the types of all losing bidders become known by the end of the …rst round; the prices in the …rst and in the second round are the same and equal to (Y
(N ) 3
). This is the same outcome that would obtain in the …rst round of the Japanese auction, but it can only happen if either the highest or the second highest bidder are selected to be active after the other N 2 bidders have already exited. The second possible outcome is that the two highest bidders (say with types x 1 and x 2 < x 1 ) are active together in the …rst round when only M < N 2 of the other bidders have already exited. In this case the …rst round price is
). The second round price is random; its expectation, conditional on P 1 , M and
, which is less than P 1 by Jensen's inequality. Since the second outcome will occur with strictly positive probability, we have proved the following proposition.
Proposition 7
With strictly positive probability, the expected price in round 2 of the two-round AR English auction with no informational externalities, conditional on the price and bid history in round 1, is lower than the price in round 1.
Announcing the Winning Prices in a Sequential Second-Price Auction
A delicate issue in sequential auctions is what information is revealed from round to round. The natural candidate is to reveal the winning price in each round. Unlike in a …rst-price auction, however, announcing the winning price in a second-price auction amounts to revealing the type of the highest loser, a bidder who will be present in the next round. As a consequence, existence of an equilibrium with increasing bidding functions is problematic.
I will now show that in the case of no informational externalities increasing equilibrium bidding functions exist and are the same as under the policy of revealing the bid of the winner.
Proposition 8
When there are no informational externalities, V (x i ; x i ) = x i ; on the equilibrium path of the symmetric equilibrium of the sequential second-price auction with announcement of the winning prices, the bidding functions can be written as
This proposition, whose proof is in Appendix C, can be understood as follows. Without informational externalities, equilibrium bids do not depend on the past history of bids, no matter whether the winning bids, or the winning prices, are announced. In both cases, in the last round it is a dominant strategy to place a bid-loss equal to the item's value. The bids in earlier rounds are then determined recursively, via the indi¤erence condition (23). History does not matter because in each round k a bidder bids as if he were pivotal (i.e., as if Y
When, on the other hand, there are informational externalities and the winning price is revealed in each round, an equilibrium of the sequential second-price auction with an increasing bidding function does not exist. The reason is simple: a bidder who, based on the history of prices, knows that he will lose in round k, but will almost certainly win in round k + 1, has an incentive to deviate and make a very low bid in round k. By doing so he will avoid being the price setter in round k: The price setter in round k will be a bidder with a lower type, and hence in round k + 1 all other bidders (including the future price setter) will have lower estimates of an object's conditional value and will make lower bids. As a result, the deviating bidder will pro…t by winning at a lower price in round k + 1. This is made clear by Example 1 in Appendix C.
Conclusions
The classic model of risk neutral bidders assumes additive separability in a bidder's preferences over objects and money. The special case of risk averse bidders that I have studied in this paper maintains additive separability, but postulates that a bidder prefers a certain price to an equivalent (on average) random price.
Additive separability of preferences makes the model very tractable. As I show in Lemma 1 in Appendix A, it implies that bidder-payo¤ equivalence holds: All auction mechanisms with the same allocation rule and which give the same payo¤ to the lowest bidder type are bidder-payo¤ equivalent.
Without additive separability, the e¤ects due to risk aversion and private information interact in a complex way; for example, as shown by Maskin and Riley (1984) , a risk neutral auctioneer choosing an optimal mechanism will not want to fully insure bidders. The simple model of aversion to price risk I studied in this paper, on the other hand, is very tractable. As a result, it yields a simple explanation of declining prices in sequential auctions. In e¤ect, declining prices allow the bidder to insure himself in the current round against next round price randomness.
The paper also uncovers an informational externality e¤ect. When there is no aversion to price risk, but there are informational externalities, prices increase between rounds of sequential auctions even when signals are independent. In essence, optimal equilibrium behaviour leads the current price setter to underestimate the signal of his highest opponent, and hence next round price.
Several empirical implications can be drawn from this paper. First, the more important a concern is price risk for bidders, the more we should expect prices to decline between rounds. Thus, for example, if there is a serious possibility that new bidders may enter in the next round, then price risk is more severe and we should expect prices to decline more.
Second, when informational externalities, or value interdependencies, are not very important, but bidders are averse to price risk, then prices are likely to decline. When value interdependencies are more important than price risk, then we should expect prices to increase between rounds. For example, if the auctioneer publishes all the information at his disposal (as the professional auction houses typically do), including value estimates of the objects for sale, then interdependencies are reduced and it is more likely that we see prices decline (as the data broadly suggests), rather than increase between rounds. If bidders are professionals, buying the goods for resale, and little information is provided about resale value by the auctioneer before the auction, then it is more likely that prices will increase between rounds. 10 Third, the less information about bidders'values transpires during a round, the more we should expect prices to decline. Thus, if each round is an oral ascending auction, the larger the number of bidders that remain silent during the initial rounds, the higher future price randomness, and hence the more likely are prices to decline between rounds.
More generally, the interaction between the aversion to price risk e¤ect and the informational externality e¤ect could help to explain the complex price paths we sometimes observe in the data. 
Appendix A
This appendix contains the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. First, it is it is useful to derive a lemma showing that bidders' payo¤s are the same in every auction having the same outcome function and yielding the same payo¤ to the lowest type of bidder.
Suppose that k objects have already been sold to the k highest type bidders, y 1 ; :::; y k ; suppose also that the winners'types have been revealed. Consider a mechanism in which k+1 (x 0 ; y N 1 ; :::; y k+1 ) is i's probability of winning one of the remaining objects and p k+1 (x 0 ; y N 1 ; :::; y k+1 ) is i's payment when he behaves as a type x 0 : Then, bidder i's expected payo¤ when his type is x; but he behaves as if his type were x 0 is U k+1 (x 0 ; x; y k ; :::; y 1 ) = Z y k ; y k ; ::;
Equation (7), combined with U k+1 (x; :::) = u, yields the bidder-payo¤ equivalence lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose k < K objects have already been sold to the highest type bidders, and the winning types have been announced. Bidders'payo¤ s are the same in any mechanism h k+1 ; p k+1 i having the same outcome function k+1 and yielding the same payo¤ to the lowest type. Equation (7) (equation (8) if the mechanism is e¢ cient) and the boundary condition U k+1 (x; :::) = u determine a bidder's payo¤ .
We are now ready to prove propositions 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let S1 k (x; y k 1 ; :::; y 1 ) be round k equilibrium bidding function. Recall that, assuming that S1 k is increasing in x; on the equilibrium path the true types of the winning bidders are revealed. Suppose that if the winning bid in round k is higher than the highest equilibrium bid, then all bidders believes that the winning bidder's type is the same as the type of the previous round's winner; if the observed winning bid in round k is below the lowest equilibrium bid, then bidders believe that the winner's type is the lowest possible type.
Let U k (x; y k 1 ; :::) be the expected payo¤ for a type x of bidder in the continuation equilibrium beginning in round k (i.e., the payo¤ conditional on having lost all previous auctions and on the history up to round k). In writing a bidder's payo¤, I will use the function v k , de…ned in (2) . Suppose that all the other bidders follow the equilibrium strategies, while bidder i is considering deviating in round k (only).
First note that, given his beliefs, it is not pro…table for bidder i to bid above the highest possible bid of the other bidders S1 k (y k 1 ; ). Bidding below the lowest possible bid is equivalent to bidding the lowest bid; in both cases winning is a zero probability event. Hence if there is a pro…table deviation, there is a pro…table deviation with a bid in the range of possible bids. The payo¤ of bidder i of type x when he bids b = S1 k (z; y k 1 ; :::) (i.e., he bids like a type z) in round k is:
Di¤erentiating with respect to z yields the …rst order condition
U k+1 (x; z; y k 1 ; ::; )f
Since on the equilibrium path it is x y k 1 ; and z = x must be optimal, we obtain the following necessary condition for equilibrium:
U k+1 (x; x; y k 1 ; ::; )f
Observe that if the signal of the winner in round k < K is x, then in round k + 1 bidder i with signal
x wins with probability 1; hence, it is U k+1 (x; x; y k 1 ; ::; ) = v k (x; x; y k 1 ; :::) `( S1 k+1 (x; x; y k 1 ; :::)):
Since U K+1 (x; x; y K 1 ; ::; ) = 0; equation (12) also holds for k = K, provided we de…ne S1 K+1 (x; x; y K 1 ; :::) = (v K (x; x; y K 1 ; :::)) :
Using (12), equation (11) can be written as ( S1 k+1 (x; x; y k 1 ; :::))f
Integrating (14) we obtaiǹ ( S1 k (x; y k 1 ; ::; y 1 )) =
k+1 (e x; e x; y k 1 ; ::; y 1 )
By (13), for k = K, this yields
Working backwards, (15) yields S1 k (x; y k 1 ; :::
and hence on the equilibrium path the bidding function must satisfy S1 k (x; y k 1 ; ::;
Note from ( , and
S1
k is independent of y 1 ; :::; y k 1 .
It remains to show that the …rst order condition (11) is a su¢ cient condition for equilibrium. Using (11) to replace the second term on the left hand side of equation (10) we obtain
+ U k+1 (z; z; y k 1 ; ::; ) U k+1 (x; z; y k 1 ; ::; ) f
Since v k is increasing in x and U K+1 = 0; for k = K the sign of @U k @z is the same as x z; hence z = x is optimal. Now suppose k < K; take …rst the case z x. Note that U k+1 (x; z; y k 1 ; ::; ) = v k (x; z; y k 1 ; :::) `( S1 k+1 (z; z; y k 1 ; :::)); because in this case bidder i wins for sure in round k, and bids S1 k+1 (minfx; zg; z; y k 1 ; :::) = S1 k+1 (z; z; y k 1 ; :::): It follows that @U k @z = 0 for z x and bidder i has no incentive to bid less than the equilibrium strategy in round k. Now suppose that z > x. By Lemma 1, equation (8) ; z; y k 1 ; ::; 
Integrating between x and z, it follows that U k+1 (z; z; y k 1 ; ::; ) U k+1 (x; z; y k 1 ; ::; ) < v k (z; z; y k 1 ; :::) v k (x; z; y k 1 ; :::);
and hence that @U k @z < 0 for z > x; bidder i has no incentive to bid more than the equilibrium strategy in round k. This concludes the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let

S2
k (x; y k 1 ; :::; y 1 ) be round k equilibrium bidding function. Suppose that if the winning bid in round k is higher than the highest equilibrium bid, then all bidders believe that the winning bidder's type is the same as the type of the previous round's winner; if the observed winning bid in round k is below the lowest equilibrium bid, then bidders believe that the winner's type is the lowest possible type.
Let U k (x; y k 1 ; :::) be the expected payo¤ for a type x of bidder at the beginning of round k. Suppose that all the other bidders follow the equilibrium strategies, while bidder i is considering deviating in round k. As for the case of a sequential …rst-price auction, if there is a pro…table deviation, there is a pro…table deviation with a bid in the range of possible bids. Recalling (2), the payo¤ of bidder i of type x when he bids b = S2 k (z; y k 1 ; :::) (i.e., he bids like a type z) in auction k can be written as:
Di¤erentiating with respect to z yields the …rst order condition v k (x; z; y k 1 ; :::) `( S2 k (z; y k 1 ; :::)) f
Since on the equilibrium path z = x must be optimal, the following is a necessary condition for equilibrium: 
If the signal of the winner in round k < K is x, then in round k + 1 bidder i with signal x wins with probability 1; hence, it is U k+1 (x; x; y k 1 ; ::; ) = v k (x; x; y k 1 ; :::)
(y k+1 ; x; y k 1 ; :::))f
Thus ( 
Recalling (21) and working backwards we obtaiǹ
Thus, we have shown that on the equilibrium path the bidding function must satisfy S2 k (x; y k 1 ; ::;
It remains to show that the …rst order condition (20) is a su¢ cient condition for equilibrium. Using (20) to replace the second term on the left hand side of equation (19) we obtain
+ U k+1 (z; z; y k 1 ; ::; ) U k+1 (x; z; y k 1 ; :::) f
Consider k = K; since v k is increasing in x and U K+1 = 0; the sign of @U K @z is the same as x z; hence z = x is optimal. Now suppose k < K; take …rst the case z x. Note that U k+1 (x; z; y k 1 ; ::; ) = v k (x; z; y k 1 ; :::)
because in this case bidder i wins for sure in round k: It follows that @U k @z = 0 for z x and bidder i has no incentive to bid less than the equilibrium strategy in round k. Now take the case z > x. As shown in (18) , by Lemma 1 we have @U k+1 (x; z; y k 1 ; :::; y 1 ) @x < @v k (x; z; y k 1 ; :::) @x :
Integrating between x and z, it follows that v k (z; z; y k 1 ; :::) v k (x; z; y k 1 ; :::) > U k+1 (z; z; y k 1 ; ::; ) U k+1 (x; z; y k 1 ; ::; );
Appendix B
In this appendix, I compute the bidding functions and price ratios for the example discussed in Section 7.
Recalling that 
The expected price in round 2, conditional on the …rst-round price P 1 is:
It follows that the ratio of the conditional expected second-round price to the …rst-round price is:
In the case of no informational externalities, that is b = 0, this becomes:
If there are informational externalities, b > 0;
depends on the signal x of the …rst-round price setter. Since x is the value of the second order statistic out of N draws, the expected value of the price ratio is Their equilibrium reduces to the equilibrium of the second-price auction when there are independent private values.
Di¤erentiating with respect to z we obtain Z z which is equal to zero for all values of z. It follows that type x has no incentive to deviate in round k.
Now consider a type x < y k , the price setter in round k 1: If in round k he bids as if he were a type z < y k , then he loses and obtains the same (expected, future) payo¤ independently of his bid. It follows that he may as well bid as a type x; by equation (8) It follows from (29) that it is not pro…table for a bidder of type x to deviate and bid more than a type y k .
This concludes the proof of the proposition.
The next example shows that with informational externalities and the winning price being revealed in each round, an equilibrium of the sequential second-price auction with an increasing bidding function does not exist.
Example 1
There are four bidders, three objects, and the common quality of an object is V = x 1 + x 2 + x 3 + x 4 .
Without loss of generality, let x 1 > x 2 > x 3 > x 4 (bidders, of course, only know their own signals). Suppose there exists an increasing equilibrium. Then bidder 1 wins the …rst round and announcing the price reveals x 2 , the signal of bidder 2. Suppose x 3 = x 2 ", with " "arbitrarily small". At the beginning of the second round, bidder 3 knows that if he bids according to the equilibrium strategy, then with probability "arbitrarily close" to 1 he will be the price setter in round 2 and win an object in round 3. The price he will pay in round 3 is the bid of bidder 4. Since this is the last round, it is a weakly dominant strategy for bidder 4 to bid b = (E[X 1 jX 1 x 2 ] + x 2 + x 3 + x 4 ) (recall that x 2 and x 3 have been revealed by the price announcements, but x 1 has not). Now consider a deviation by bidder 3 in round 2; suppose he bids zero.
Then the price setter in round 2 is bidder 4 and his signal is revealed. In round 3 bidder 4's weakly dominant bid is b b = (E[X 1 jX 1 x 2 ] + x 2 + 2x 4 ), since bidder 4 assumes he is pivotal; that is, he assumes x 3 = x 4 .
After having deviated in round 2, in round 3 bidder 3's weakly dominant strategy is to use a bid-loss equal to the conditional expected value of the object; that is, he will bid (E[X 1 jX 1 x 2 ] + x 2 + x 3 + x 4 ). It follows that by deviating bidder 3 will win in the third round and pay a price b b which is less than the price b he would pay if he followed the equilibrium strategy. Hence we have a contradiction; bidder 3 of type x 3 = x 2 " has a pro…table deviation in round 2 from the supposed increasing equilibrium.
